These observations show that despite the positive final outcome of the referenda, support for EU membership is not universally shared within the new member countries. The consequences of accession are likely to diverge across various socio-economic groups, with some gaining and others losing. Therefore, assuming voters are prospectively oriented and thus take their future well being into account when casting their vote, the extent of support for EU membership should reflect the distribution of expected gains and losses. 5 In order to gain insights into the factors that shape support for the ultimate economic reform, i.e., EU membership, this paper analyses voting behaviour in the accession referenda utilising two previously untapped 1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU on 1 st May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are tentatively scheduled to become members as of 2007, while no accession date has been set for Turkey. 2 Cyprus approved the accession in the legislature, thus being the only candidate country that did not hold a referendum. 3 No such threshold was in effect in the Czech Republic, whereas Hungary required either at least 50% participation or an affirmative vote by at least 25% of eligible voters. 4 In the presence of minimum turnout requirements, non-participation can indicate either indifference or strategic considerations, whereby one abstains in the hope of driving the participation rate below the legally mandated threshold. 5 An alternative explanation for the low turnout rates is that voters used the accession referendum to express their discontent with the current government. However, if membership in the EU is going to be largely beneficial for most voters, forgoing these gains seems a high price for sending a message to the incumbent government. data sources. First, the actual referenda results at the regional level in seven candidate countries are considered: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Second, this analysis is complemented with individual data on voting intentions in the EU referendum from the March/April 2002 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) survey covering all 13 candidate countries.
Accession will affect the citizens of the new member countries in at least two distinct ways. 6 As previous studies (e.g., Gabel, 1998 Gabel, , 2000 have shown that utilitarian considerations are one of the most important determinants of support for the EU, this paper focuses on the economic repercussions of membership, thus omitting political and emotional considerations, such as the dilution or loss of national identity, etc. First, the new members can take full advantage of economic integration within the European Single Market, bringing with it the free movement of goods, capital andalbeit with a lag of up to seven years -labour. While this opens up important opportunities for the new entrants, it also brings considerable challenges (e.g., increased competitive pressure and more stringent EU regulations). Second, as the new members are relatively poor compared to the EU-15 states, stricken with high unemployment and, in some cases, large agricultural sectors, they should benefit from redistribution within the EU channelled through the Structural and Cohesion funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
As the candidate countries display considerable economic disparities both at the individual and regional level, the variation in expected net gains from accession among individuals and regions should be considerable. An individual's expected net gain from EU membership, should to a large extent, depend on his individual characteristics such as age, education, employment or current income. In addition, as regions differ in their underlying economic structure, the regional repercussions of accession will also be uneven -a region predominantly oriented towards agriculture or heavy industry, for instance, will fare differently from one dominated by service industries. As a large part of EU spending is explicitly linked to regional characteristics such as average per-capita income or unemployment, individual regions' entitlement to transfers from the EU will differ substantially. This paper 6 A number of recent studies have assessed the expected benefits of EU membership using sophisticated modelling techniques (see for example Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 1997; Breuss, 2001; and Lejour, de Mooij and Nahuis, 2001; and DIW, 2002) .
explicitly controls for these kinds of effects in order to assess their impact on support for EU membership.
As previous research has shown (e.g., Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2003 ) the outcome of the economic reform process affected different socio-economic groups and regions in diverging ways, with some groups gaining and other losing. Such studies find that the "winners" of the transition process are generally young well-educated individuals, who can take advantage of the new opportunities available in the market economy.
The "losers", conversely, are whose possessing human capital characteristics that may be outdated in a market economy and find it difficult to adjust to the new environment e.g., elderly blue-collar workers with little education. Typically, the winners of the transition process tend to support the continuation of reforms, while the losers oppose them. This paper therefore extends this analysis by examining support for the pinnacle of the transition process -membership to the European Union. It is likely therefore, that support for EU membership may follow a similar pattern.
This paper differs from related literature in two ways. First, while support for the EU has attracted considerable attention in the academic literature, most previous studies have been limited to considering the current EU members (see Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997 , and the references therein). Second, those few studies that do analyse support for EU membership in the candidate countries typically rely on individual survey data which was collected in the early to mid 1990s:
the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, commissioned by the European Commission and discontinued in 1998 (see Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky, 2002; Tverdova and Anderson, 2003; and Kemmerling, 2003) . These analyses are based on respondents' statements about their intended voting in a referendum on EU membership and support for the EU. However, given the time lag between these surveys and the actual referenda, which only took place in 2003, the respondents opinions might have been different had the prospect of membership been more tangible.
This analysis, in contrast, uses both actual (regional) results of the referenda, and individual survey data from the recently reinstated Candidate Countries'
Eurobarometer, collected in Spring 2002, approximately one year before the actual referenda took place. The only other study to use the actual referenda results is Markowski and Tucker (2003) , who similarly use opinion-poll data and actual regional results in their analysis of Poland. Finally, much of the previous literature, whether on current members or the candidate countries, relies on various attitudinal variables (in addition to socio-economic characteristics) such as the respondents' ideological identification, political opinions, or their attitude towards the EU to explain support for integration. These studies find that respondents who expect their country to benefit from accession to the EU intend to vote in favour of membership.
One potential problem with using such attitudinal variables to explain vote choice is that it is difficult to disentangle the endogeneity between the two variables. Previous studies (Wleizen, Franklin and Twiggs, 1996; and Doyle, 2004) The following section briefly reviews the history of this recent enlargement.
Section 3 discusses the likely gains and losses associated with accession to the EU.
Section 4 introduces the data used in the analysis and sections 5 and 6 present the empirical findings. Finally, the last section discusses the results and derives some conclusions. In summary, integration is likely to have important and uneven repercussions for different socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, it is not straightforward enough to enable a-priori predictions to be made as to which groups will gain and which will lose, as the repercussions of integration crucially hinge on the relative competitiveness of firms and relative factor endowments in the current and the new members.
Redistribution
The new members will be included in the EU-wide system of redistribution including countries that are below 90% of the EU average GDP qualify. These transfers are allocated at the national level, in contrast to the Structural Funds, and are mainly designated for large public investment projects. Again, all new member states meet the eligibility criterion in the enlarged EU.
The ability of the new members to fully benefit from EU transfers however, will be limited, at least initially, due to recently agreed reforms and transitional arrangements. In particular, the European Council in Berlin decided that the previously-agreed EU budget for 2000-06 will not be extended to finance this enlargement and only modest transfers will be made to the acceding countries up until 2006. Thus, the new members receipts from the EU budget will amount on average to 1% of their GDP in 2004, rising to 1.5% by 2006 (11 and 16 billion euro, respectively, according to Barysch, 2003) . 10 Moreover, EU transfers might, at least partially, displace any assistance that the depressed regions are receiving from their national governments at present (Vlachos, 2003, makes In summary, the new members can expect to be net recipients of transfers from the EU budget. Since a large part of EU funds are disbursed directly to regions or even individual recipients (as is the case with the CAP), underdeveloped, poor, overindustrialized and/or agricultural regions should benefit more than others. The remainder of the paper studies how these potential gains translate into both voting intentions and behaviour in the candidate countries' referenda on EU membership.
10 These figures, however, combine receipts from Structural and Cohesion Funds with the CAP.
Data
The empirical analysis utilises two previously untapped data sources: actual referenda results at the regional level, and survey data on intended voting in a future referendum on EU membership. The regional analysis is performed for seven countries: Czech Thus, a voter who was opposed to accession was more likely to thwart the referendum by not participating than by voting against it.
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To ascertain how participation in the referenda on EU membership compares with participation in regular elections, the last column of Table 2 reports the turnout rates recorded in the most recent parliamentary election in each country. In three cases (Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) turnout was lower in the referendum than in the previous election by ten percentage points or more, while the opposite was the case for Poland. The remaining six countries are more or less equally split between those that had somewhat higher turnout rates in the referendum (Lithuania and Estonia) and those that experienced a small decline in turnout compared to the most recent election (Malta and the Czech Republic), with Latvia reporting almost no change. While strategic considerations may have contributed to low participation in some countries, this does not appear to be a generally shared phenomenon. regional results of the EU accession referenda. Both support for membership and turnout are analysed separately, as it is possible that those who opposed EU membership may have chosen not to vote, hoping that their abstention would be more effective in keeping the turnout below the legally mandated minimum threshold, thus rendering the result invalid. As the primary interest of this paper is to determine whether patterns of support can be generalised across the seven candidate countries and because each referendum was held with essentially the same underlying question, the regional data is pooled across all countries. 18 The choice of explanatory variables for the pooled regressions is then dictated by the need to find the 'smallest common denominator' in terms of availability and comparability of data across countries.
Therefore, both support for membership and turnout are regressed on regional unemployment rates, average wages and employment in the main branches of the economy: agriculture, industry (which also includes construction), and services (as the omitted category). All regressions also contain country dummies.
Pooled Regional Results
The results obtained concerning the support for EU membership are reported in Table   5 , while those for participation are in The results for support and participation are quite dissimilar, suggesting that different considerations were driving voting behaviour and participation in the referenda. The unemployment rate is positively related to support for EU membership (although it is only significant after the structure of employment is controlled for). In contrast, higher unemployment rates translate into lower participation in the referenda.
The opposite holds for wages (although the estimated coefficients are at best marginally significant): they appear with a negative sign in the regressions for support and with a positive sign in those for participation. As discussed above, it is not clear The second columns show that when employment in the main sectors of the economy are added (except for Latvia and Lithuania for which comparable employment data is not available), the share of employment in agriculture is negatively correlated with support for EU membership and (along with the share of employment in industry) also with turnout. Thus, it appears that workers in these sectors fear they will lose out, or at least, do not expect to benefit as much from accession compared to the service sector (the omitted category). In particular, the negative impact of employment in agriculture on support for accession and turnout may also reflect fears concerning the opening up of the market for agricultural goods and disappointment with the low level of subsides from the CAP that farmers in the new member countries will receive. Similarly, the negative coefficient obtained for industrial employment may be motivated by fears that membership in the EU will accelerate the downsizing of inefficient firms.
Suburban districts display higher support for membership and higher participation than regions with comparable economic conditions that are further away from major cities (however, the coefficient is only significant when the regressions include the employment variables). This suggests that economic conditions in the adjacent urban region (which tend to be more favourable than conditions in rural areas) have an important impact on suburban voters' political preferences. Finally, the coefficients on country dummies are all strongly significant, both for support and participation, indicating that there are important differences in support for EU membership across countries beyond those can be attributed to different objective economic conditions (at least as measured by the very basic indicators used in this analysis). Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania display higher support for membership than the Czech Republic (the omitting category), while Poland, Estonia and Latvia display lower support. In regards turnout, the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were more likely to turnout out to vote, than the Czechs, while the Polish, Hungarian and Slovaks were less likely to turnout to vote.
Individual Determinants of Support for EU Membership
The previous section found that support for membership was higher but turnout was lower in depressed regions. It also observed that both support for accession and turnout were lower in regions with a large share of employment in agriculture and industry. These results were obtained at an aggregate level -by analysing regional variation in support for membership and participation. While these results yield valuable insights for our understanding of pro-EU sentiment in the candidate countries, as they were obtained at the regional level, their extension to the individualvoter level is not straightforward. Therefore, this section extends this analysis by using data from the March/April 2002 CCEB survey.
Model 1: Determinants of Voting Intentions
The dependent variable in model 1 is based on responses to the following question:
"And if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (our country)'s membership, would you personally vote for or against it?"
The possible answers included: "for", "against", and "I would not go to vote". As in the preceding section, both the support for EU membership and participation in the referendum are considered. As "not going to vote" was presented as one of the alternatives in parallel with voting for or against accession, the respondents' choices are analysed jointly by means of a multinomial logit regression 20 (see Alvarez and Nagler, 1998 , for a discussion of the applicability of different statistical methods to decisions situations with multiple choices). This method requires that one of the choices is designated as the base category, therefore, to make the interpretation of the coefficient estimates straightforward, "voting against" is designated as the base category.
A number of socio-economic variables are included among the explanatory variables: gender, marital status, age (including a quadratic term), number of children in the household, number of household members, dummies for education, occupation and place of residence (village, small town or city), respondents' history of unemployment (number of unemployment spells over the past five years) and household income or standard of living. Concerning the latter, regressions estimated using self-reported well-being (rich, comfortable, average, getting along or poor, with rich/comfortable being the reference category) are reported. The results obtained with nationally based income quartiles and an indicator stating whether the respondent considers their household income higher than necessary, sufficient or insufficient to meet their household's needs (insufficient income being the omitted category) are qualitatively very similar and therefore are not reported (they can be obtained from the author upon request). Finally, a number of dummy variables indicating the respondent's country are also included in order to take account of country specific effects.
Results of Model 1
The results of model 1 are presented in Table 7 . The first column presents the coefficient estimates for the probability of choosing "voting in favour" compared to "voting against". The second column, similarly, reports the coefficient estimates characterising the probability of choosing "not voting" compared to "voting against".
In addition, as the coefficients in MNL models are difficult to interpret since they correspond to the relative effect of each independent variable on the log-odds ratio of a given party in comparison to the base category, the marginal effects are also reported beside the coefficient estimates.
asked in the survey was posed as a single question with 3 choices 1. Vote Yes, 2. Vote No, 3. Do Not Vote, the respondent had to make the decision simultaneously, not sequentially as modelled in a Heckman Probit. Second, due to the high number of parameters, the model would only converge when the majority of the explanatory variables were excluded.
In order to interpret how the various factors affect respondents' choices over the three alternative courses of action (voting in favour, voting against or not participating), one has to consider both sets of results jointly. Accordingly, women are less likely than men to participate in the referendum, whereas the opposite holds for married respondents. However, neither gender nor marital status is correlated with supporting membership among those who intend to vote. Older respondents are less likely to choose either voting in favour or abstaining, suggesting that age is correlated with the probability of voting against EU membership (the relationship is U-shaped, so that support and non-participation start increasing again once the respondent reaches 50 years of age). Higher education and being a student both increase the likelihood of participating and voting in favour of EU membership. Having a whitecollar occupation, a higher standard of living (or higher income), and living in a town or city are all associated with higher support for accession but do not affect the choice between voting against or not participating. Current unemployment and having experienced two or more unemployment spells in the past have an opposite effect on participation, suggesting that unemployed respondents are more likely to participate, except for those who have a history of multiple past unemployment spells. Neither being currently unemployed nor having had unemployment spells in the past, however, affects the respondents' support for the EU (unemployment may lower support for accession indirectly because it lowers the respondents' well-being but does not appear to have an effect going beyond that). Farmers, finally, are less likely to cast a vote in favour of EU membership and, even more so, less likely to abstain, indicating that farmers are quite strongly opposed to entering the EU.
Even after controlling for individual characteristics, the country dummies remain strongly significant, indicating that there are important differences in attitudes towards the EU at the aggregate level. In particular, most countries, with the exception of Romania and Hungary, are less supportive of the accession than Bulgaria (which is the omitted country), with Malta, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia appearing especially sceptical about accession. Interestingly, Turkey, which appeared strongly pro-EU (along with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) when reviewing aggregate numbers, turns out less enthusiastic about EU membership after individual characteristics are controlled for. It is interesting to note that Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, which show relatively high rates of support for EU membership, have also higher rates of intended non-participation than the other countries. This indicates that the high aggregate levels of support for EU membership in these countries may in fact disguise the fact the opponents of accession tend to choose non-participation rather than cast a negative vote.
Model 2: Attitudes towards the EU and Voting Intentions
Voters in any election are faced with two distinct decisions: they must first decide whether to participate or not and, second, they must choose how to cast their vote. The analysis so far could only investigate the attitudes towards EU membership for those respondents who indicated that they would participate in the referendum. This is dictated by the data, as the respondents who did not intend to vote (or were undecided)
were not asked which outcome they would, nevertheless, prefer. It is possible, however, to obtain an insight into the preferences of abstainers by using a question that asks respondents whether they think their country will benefit from EU
membership ("Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?"). Crosstabulating responses to this question with those on intended voting indicates that
voting intentions are indeed closely correlated with expectations on gains from membership: only approximately 5% of those who intend to vote in favour of accession think that their country could not gain from it; among those opposed to EU membership, 15% expect their country to gain nonetheless.
Respondents are therefore divided into four groups: (1) those who believe their country will not benefit from membership and do not intend to participate, (2) those who believe their country will not benefit from membership but intend to participate, (3) those who believe their country will benefit from membership but do not intend to participate, and (4) those who believe their country will benefit from membership and intend to participate. Again, a multinomial logit model is employed to analyse respondents' decisions over multiple choices. The EU pessimistic respondents who intend to vote, i.e. 2, (this being the second largest category of the four) is designated as the base category. Regression results with income measured again by self-reported well-being are reported in Table 8 . 
Results of Model 2
The results for the EU optimists who intend to vote are similar to those obtained above for the Yes vote -not surprisingly, as the two regression equations are estimated over very similar supports. As before one should consider results across all three categories jointly to make proper inferences about attitudes towards the EU.
Women are less likely to participate, however, there is little difference between those who are optimistic and those who are pessimistic about EU membership. Married respondents are less likely to be non-voting pessimists and, therefore, more likely to belong in any of the three remaining categories. Both of these results further refine the findings reported previously. The probability of being an optimist (voting or not) falls with age so that older people tend to be less enthusiastic about accession, but the effect again appears U-shaped, at least for those who intend to vote, and becomes positive after reaching approximately the age of 62 (a similar finding to the preceding paper). Students, those with university education and white-collar professionals are more likely to be optimists and cast their vote and less likely to be non-voting pessimists (i.e., education and skill are also positively correlated with overall participation). Again, farmers appear strongly sceptical about the entry into the EU.
The pattern for subjective well-being is similar across all three categories: poorer respondents are less likely to belong to any category and thus are more likely to be pessimistic about accession and also participate in the referendum; this effect is particularly strong for the least affluent group. Finally, while current unemployment does not significantly affect any category, those who had been unemployed at least twice in the past are more likely to be optimistic about accession, but abstain from voting. Thus, while unemployment experience does not make people more pessimistic about EU membership, it does discourage them from voting in the referendum -a finding that is similar to the one obtained for unemployment in the regional analysis.
MNL and Tests of IIA
It is necessary to carry out both the Hausman and Small-Hsiao test in order to test overwhelming. In a number of cases (for example Malta, the Czech Republic and Estonia), it appeared conceivable beforehand that the referendum would not pass.
Although all the referenda eventually resulted in an endorsement for accession, these high rates of support often disguised very low rates of voter turnout. In some countries (e.g., Poland and Slovakia), the turnouts barely exceeded the legally mandated 50%
threshold that was required to make the vote binding.
This paper sheds some light on these developments by analysing the regional and individual determinants of support for accession and voters' participation in the referenda. It is argued that accession will affect the citizens of the new member countries in two ways: through efficiency gains and new economic opportunities arising from accession to the European Single Market, and by being included in the EU-wide system of redistribution via Structural and Cohesion funds and the Common Agricultural Policy. However, each effect will have different implications for the various socio-economic groups, with some gaining and others undoubtedly losing. By relating voting behaviour in the referenda or voting intentions as expressed in opinion polls, to regional and individual socio-economic characteristics, it is possible to identify the winners and losers of this EU enlargement.
The empirical results find that those with favourable and relatively flexible human capital tend to support EU membership. In particular, those with high education (or still in school), white-collar occupations, high income, young age and living in urban areas are more likely to participate in the accession referenda and vote in favour of EU membership. Similarly, regions with favourable economic conditions (low unemployment and high wages) display greater turnout (albeit not greater support). In contrast, and surprisingly, those who should in principle benefit from redistribution in the EU -the elderly, blue-collar workers, less educated, those with repeated history of unemployment, those living in rural areas and also those living in underdeveloped or agricultural regions -tend to be against accession and/or do not vote. Hence, it appears that the nationals of the new member states tend to put a greater weight on the gains from improved efficiency and new opportunities, while they discount potential benefits from receiving subsidies from the richer EU member states. The latter conclusion appears surprising at first sight, however it seems warranted given that the transfers which the new members will receive have been revised and in effect scaled down considerably compared to expectations, and also relative to the transfers received by other less developed entrants in the wake of previous enlargements.
Another plausible explanation is that voters perceive accession to the EU as a natural continuation, and indeed ultimate outcome, of the post-communist transition from central planning to a market economy, and therefore their support for EU membership reflects whether they gained or lost from market-oriented reforms (and whether they expect to gain from further liberalisation and intensification of competition). Indeed, the supporters of EU membership tend to have similar socioeconomic profiles as voters of liberal, pro-reform parties (see Fidrmuc, 2000a,b; Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2001; Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2003; and Doyle, 2004. 22 Furthermore, membership in the EU, and eventually in the EMU, will impose important constraints on national fiscal policy and thus the ability of governments to compensate those made worse off by accession as well as the on-going reform process (Vlachos, 2003 , makes a similar point about voting in the Swedish referendum preceding that country's EU entry in 1995).
Finally, and importantly, these findings show that voters in the new states supported accession holding greater efficiency and economic integration rather than fiscal transfers as their primary motivation. There is little political will among the EU-15 members to finance this enlargement by extending the transfers and subsidies to the ten new member countries without a substantial reform of the redistribution system. The voters in the new members appear to be aware of this but they approved the accession nonetheless. Thus, while the scaling down of the scope for transfers and subsidies (relative to initial expectations) probably helped drive down the support for EU membership, the other benefits (efficiency improvements but also increased political and economic stability) made the prospect of EU membership sufficiently attractive to sway a critical mass of voters in favour of accession. Notes: All estimated with pooled OLS, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Unemployment rate is in percent. Wage ratio is the ratio of regional average wage to the national average wage. Agriculture and industry/construction are percentage shares of total employment, with services being the omitted category (structure of employment is not available for Latvia and Lithuania). The Czech Republic is the omitted category with respect to country dummies. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Notes: All estimated with pooled OLS, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Unemployment rate is in percent. Wage ratio is the ratio of regional average wage to the national average wage. Agriculture and industry/construction are percentage shares of total employment, with services being the omitted category (structure of employment is not available for Latvia and Lithuania). The Czech Republic is the omitted category with respect to country dummies. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Notes: Coefficient estimates and marginal effects are reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable corresponds to the following question: "And if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (country)'s membership, would you personally vote for or against it?" Possible answers are 'for', 'against', and 'will not vote'. Both equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'will vote against EU membership' being the base category. The omitted categories are: male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, no past unemployment experience, rich/very comfortable/comfortable well-being, village/rural area, and Bulgaria. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Notes: Coefficient estimates and marginal effects are reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. All three equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'EU pessimist -will participate' being the base category. The dependent variable combines answers to the question "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (country) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?" with an indication on intended participation in the referendum on EU membership. The omitted categories are: male, not married or cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, no past unemployment experience, rich/comfortable well-being, village/rural area, and Bulgaria. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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